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Tradeoffs Between Sequences:
Weighing Accumulated Outcomes Against Outcome-Adjusted Delays
Daniel Read
Warwick Business School, Coventry, United Kingdom
Marc Scholten
ISPA University Institute, Lisbon, Portugal
We extend the recently proposed tradeoff model of intertemporal choice (Scholten & Read, 2010) from
choices between pairs of single outcomes to pairwise choices involving two-outcome sequences. The
core of our proposal is that choices between sequences are made by weighing accumulated outcomes
against outcome-adjusted delays. Thus extended, the tradeoff model offers a unified account of recently
discovered anomalies in pairwise choices involving two-outcome sequences, including (a) the hidden-
zero effect, in which explicit reference to the zero outcomes of the options increases patience, (b) the
front-end amount effect, in which the addition of a front-end amount to both options decreases patience,
and (c) the mere token effect, in which the addition of an early outcome to both options increases
patience. Not only does the extended tradeoff model accommodate these anomalies, it also correctly
predicts (d) violations of independence, (e) a reversal of the front-end amount effect, (f) the effect of
relocating the front-end amount to the back end of both options, and (g) a dependence of the “mere” token
effect on the magnitude of the token. In quantitative analyses, the extended tradeoff model offers an
accurate account of the data.
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Compare the following choices, each between a pair of single
outcomes: one smaller but sooner (SS) and the other larger but later
(LL):
Pair A: SS $10 today
LL $30 in 2 months
Pair AC: SS $1,010 today
LL $1,030 in 2 months
Pair AC is constructed from Pair A by adding a constant (C 
$1,000) to both outcomes ($10 and $30). The relative magnitude
effect (Scholten & Read, 2010) is that this decreases the preference
for LL over SS. A simple psychological model in which decision
makers compare the interest rate they will earn by choosing LL
with the minimum interest they want to earn for waiting (which is
sometimes called the pure rate of time preference) naturally pre-
dicts this effect, because adding a common amount to both out-
comes reduces the interest rate. The first choice offers a monthly
interest rate of about 73%, while the second offers about 1%.1 On
closer scrutiny, however, the interest-rate model fails. Three re-
cently reported results show anomalies to this model when SS and
LL are expanded into elementary sequences of two outcomes.
One sequence effect is the hidden-zero effect (Magen, Dweck, &
Gross, 2008), which is that by making it explicit that SS will pay
zero when LL pays out and that LL will pay zero when SS pays out,
thus turning both options into two-outcome sequences, the prefer-
ence for LL increases. To illustrate, we compare the previously
described Pair A with Pair AZ, in which the zero outcomes are
made explicit:
Pair A: SS $10 today
LL $30 in 2 months
Pair AZ: SS $10 today and $0 in 2 months
LL $0 today and $30 in 2 months
Choice of LL is more likely in Pair AZ than in Pair A. This is an
anomaly to the interest-rate model, because making the zero out-
comes explicit leaves the interest rate unchanged.
Another sequence effect is what we call the front-end amount
effect (Rao & Li, 2011), which is that by adding a common amount
to the immediate outcomes of both options, thus turning LL into a
two-outcome sequence, the preference for LL decreases. To illus-
trate, we compare the now-familiar Pair A with Pair AF, in which
a common amount (F  $1,000) is added to the immediate
outcomes of both options:
1 This “psychological” model is often described as the normative model
from economics, but the two models differ in that the economic model
holds that people will choose to maximize the opportunity cost of money,
which entails choosing LL if the interest rate offered exceeds the (risk-
adjusted) interest rate they can earn from other uses of money. See Read,
Frederick, and Scholten (2012) for further details. This economic model
predicts that a person will choose on the basis of a single interest rate, just
as does the psychological model.
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Pair A: SS $10 today
LL $30 in 2 months
Pair AF: SS $1,010 today
LL $1,000 and $30 in 2 months
Choice of LL is less likely in Pair AF than in Pair A. This is again
an anomaly to the interest-rate model, because adding the front-
end amount to both options leaves the interest rate unchanged: The
interest rate derives from the ratio between how much more LL
offers later and how much more SS offers sooner, and this ratio is
$30/$10 in both choices.2 Note that, in choices involving se-
quences, SS is the option that yields more in the first period but less
across the two periods.
A third sequence effect is the mere token effect (Urminsky &
Kivetz, 2011), which is that by adding a sooner outcome (the
token) to both options, thus turning both options into two-outcome
sequences, preference for LL increases. To illustrate, compare the
following option pairs:
Pair B: SS $300 in 1 week
LL $900 in 1 year
Pair BT: SS $50 in 3 days and $300 in 1 week
LL $50 in 3 days and $900 in 1 year
Choice of LL is more likely in Pair BT than in Pair B. This is once
more an anomaly to the interest-rate model, because the common
outcome cancels out in the computation of the interest rate.
Our goal in this article is to develop a theoretical account of
these three phenomena and to provide new evidence to support that
account. We extend the recently proposed tradeoff model of inter-
temporal choice (Scholten & Read, 2010) from choices between
pairs of single outcomes to pairwise choices involving elementary
sequences of two outcomes. In its original form, the tradeoff model
accommodates the full range of anomalies to the interest-rate
model in choices between pairs of single outcomes, many of which
are also anomalies to established models like the discounted utility
model (Samuelson, 1937) and the (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting
model (Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).3 In this
article, we show that the extended tradeoff model accurately ac-
counts for anomalies in choices between a single outcome and a
two-outcome sequence and choices between pairs of two-outcome
sequences.
The Tradeoff Model
Original Tradeoff Model
Conceptually, the tradeoff model weighs time against outcome,
whereas the interest-rate model and other discounting models
weigh outcome by time. Consider a choice between a pair of single
outcomes, as in Pairs A and AC. In abstract notation, these are
choices between (xS, tS) and (xL, tL), where xL  xS  0 and tL 
tS  0. In Pair A, xS and xL are $10 and $30, and tS and tL are
“today” and “in 2 months.” As described by the tradeoff model, SS
has an advantage over LL along the time attribute (the difference
between delays: It pays 2 months sooner), whereas LL has an
advantage over SS along the outcome attribute (the difference
between outcomes: It pays $20 more). These advantages are not
differences between raw attribute amounts; rather, they are differ-
ences between weighted delays, w(tL)  w(tS), and differences
between valued outcomes, v(xL)  v(xS). The decision maker
prefers SS when the time advantage is greater, prefers LL when the
outcome advantage is greater, and is indifferent between the op-
tions when the time advantage equals the outcome advantage:
vxL vxS wtL wtS, (1)
where   0 is a tradeoff parameter, which scales the difference
between weighted delays and the difference between valued out-
comes to a common currency.4
The value function v and the time-weighing function w are
reference-dependent functions ranging from identity functions,
that is, v(x)  x and w(t)  t (constant sensitivity) to zero
functions, that is, v(x)  0 for all x, and w(t)  0 for all t
(insensitivity). Between these two limits, v and w are concave
functions, thus exhibiting diminishing (absolute) sensitivity (see
Scholten & Read, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): The mar-
ginal impact of an outcome decreases with its magnitude (e.g.,
adding $10 to $20 has a bigger impact than adding $10 to $200),
and the marginal impact of a delay decreases with its length (e.g.,
adding 1 week to 1 day has a bigger impact than adding it to 1
year).
Extended Tradeoff Model
We extend the tradeoff model from choices between pairs of
single outcomes to pairwise choices involving two-outcome se-
quences and thus accommodate the anomalies described in the
introduction and in the experiments that follow. For two-outcome
sequences, the options are SS  (xS1, tS1; xS2, tS2) and LL  (xL1, tL1;
xL2, tL2), where SS offers a greater gain than LL in Period 1 (i.e.,
xS1  xL1), but LL offers a greater gain across the two periods (i.e.,
xL1 	 xL2  xS1 	 xS2. To illustrate, in the choice between “$10
today and $30 in 2 months” and “$5 today and $35 in 2 months,”
the first sequence is SS, because it offers more in Period 1, and the
second sequence is LL, because it offers more across the two
periods.
The key intuition underlying the extended tradeoff model is that
people treat a two-outcome sequence as a single dated outcome
x, tˆ, where x is the total amount offered by the sequence (i.e., x 
x1 	 x2), and tˆ is the “average” delay, where the averaging process
depends on the magnitude of the outcomes. Thus, for instance, the
sequence “$500 today and $30 in 2 months” might be treated as
the single dated outcome “$530 in 2 weeks.” The 2-week delay of
2 For the choice between “$1,010 today” and “$1,000 today and $30 in
2 months,” the interest rate would be computed as r 
 $30 $0$1,010 $1,000
1/20
 1.
3 For documentation and discussion of these anomalies, see Leland
(2002), Read (2001), Roelofsma and Read (2000), Rubinstein (2003), and
Scholten and Read (2006, 2010), among others.
4 In the original, and more general, statement of the tradeoff model,  is
a parameter of a nonlinear tradeoff function (Scholten & Read, 2010,
2012a, 2012b). In Equation 1, this nonlinear tradeoff function is reduced to
a simple multiplication by a tradeoff parameter . The simplified statement
suffices for the current analysis because, by the design of our experiments,
in which delays are held constant (at 0 and 2 months), we control for the
phenomena accommodated by the nonlinear tradeoff function.
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the single dated outcome is an average of the zero delay and the
2-month delay of the sequence, where a greater weight is assigned
to the zero delay than to the 2-month delay, because $500 is a
larger outcome than $30. The extended tradeoff model is described
more precisely, and more exhaustively, by the following proposi-
tions:
1. Outcome accumulation. The outcomes of a sequence are
first summed and then valued, that is, vx1  x2.
2. Delay adjustment. The adjusted delay to the accumulated
outcome is an average of the delays to the constituent outcomes.
The average lies between the weighted and unweighted average of
the delays, as implied by the following propositions.
2.1. Toward weighted averaging: Outcome-dependent weighing of
delays to nonzero outcomes. In weighing delays to nonzero out-
comes against one another, the weight of a delay to an outcome
increases with the magnitude of the outcome. For instance, the ad-
justed delay of “$500 today and $530 in 2 months” is longer than the
adjusted delay of “$500 today and $30 in 2 months.”
2.2. Toward unweighted averaging: Outcome-independent weigh-
ing of delays to stated zero outcomes. In weighing a delay to a stated
zero outcome against a delay to a nonzero outcome, the weight of the
delay to the stated zero outcome is independent of the magnitude of
the nonzero outcome. For instance, the adjusted delay of “$0 today
and $30 in 2 months” is shorter than the (unadjusted) delay of “$30 in
2 months,” but no shorter than the adjusted delay of “$0 today and
$530 in 2 months.”
Formally, Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 imply a single averaging
rule. According to this rule, the adjusted delay is
tˆ
qx2  x1t1  qx1  x2t2
1 qx1  x2
if x1, x2  0, (2)
where q ranges from 0 (tˆ is the weighted average of t1 and t2) to 1
(tˆ is the unweighted average of t1 and t2). When x1 is a stated zero
outcome, Equation 2 reduces to
tˆ
qt1  t2
1 q ,
which is independent of amount, and lies between t1 and t2.
Conversely, when x2 is a stated zero outcome, Equation 2 reduces
to
tˆ
t1  qt2
1 q .
When x1 is an unstated zero outcome, tˆ  t2; conversely, when x2
is an unstated zero outcome, tˆ  t1.
In addition to these propositions, which are original with the
extended tradeoff model, we introduce a third that is already well
established. This third proposition describes a preference pattern
that emerges in our experiments as well.
3. Preference for spreading (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993).
Deviation from a uniform distribution of outcomes detracts from
the value of the accumulated outcome; that is, v(x1 	 x2)  
d(x1,
x2), where d is the deviation from a uniform distribution, or,
following Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), half the absolute devi-
ation between the outcomes, that is, 1/2x1 – x2, and 
  0 is
preference for spreading. For instance, in the choice between “$20
today and $0 in 2 months” and “$10 today and $30 in 2 months,”
SS and LL deviate equally from a uniform distribution (d  10).
Alternatively, in the choice between “$10 today and $10 in 2
months” and “$0 today and $40 in 2 months,” LL deviates from a
uniform distribution (d  20), but SS does not (d  0).
Tradeoff rule. Given these propositions, the decision maker
will, in the extended tradeoff model, be indifferent between SS and
LL when
vxL1  xL2 vxS1  xS2 
dxL1, xL2 dxS1, xS2
 wtˆL wtˆS, (3)
where the adjusted delays, tˆL and tˆS, are given by Equation 2. When
both xS2 and xL1 are unstated zero outcomes, the extended tradeoff
model in Equation 3 reduces to the original tradeoff model in
Equation 1. We next conducted a series four experiments in which
we tested implications of the extended tradeoff model.
Experiment 1: Violation of Independence
In Experiment 1, we examined a manipulation that pits the effect
of delay adjustment against the effect of diminishing sensitivity to
accumulated outcomes. The net result of this manipulation is a
violation of independence, analogous to the ones obtained by
Loewenstein (1987) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1993). This
violation of independence, however, favors the tradeoff model
over alternative models.
Given a choice between two single outcomes, (xS, tS) and (xL,
tL), we construct a choice between two sequences by inserting, in
both options, an intermediate outcome, xM, available after an
intermediate delay tM. Conventional discounting models predict
that the common consequence will not affect choice, because it
cancels out in the comparison between SS and LL. An additional
aspect of our manipulation is that xM lies exactly between xS and
xL; that is., xL  xM  xM  xS. This neutralizes the preference for
spreading, because d(xM, xL)  d(xS, xM), and any preference for
improvement, as identified by Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993)
model of preferences over sequences. Thus, current models predict
that the common consequence will not affect choice.
The tradeoff model predicts that the common consequence can
either decrease or increase the preference for LL, depending on the
relative contribution of two processes. On the one hand, the
sensitivity to the outcome difference between LL and SS dimin-
ishes, that is, v(xL 	 xM) – v(xS 	 xM)  v(xL) – v(xS), which
decreases the preference for LL. On the other hand, the delay of SS
increases (i.e., tˆS  tS), whereas the delay of LL decreases (i.e.,
tˆL  tL), which increases the preference for LL. If one process
outweighs the other, there will be a violation of independence.
In Experiment 1, the outcomes are xS  $300, xM  $350, and
xL  $400, and the delays (in weeks) are tS  0, tM  4, and tL 
50. With these outcomes and delays, the effect of diminishing
sensitivity to accumulated outcomes is small relative to the effect
of delay adjustment. Figure 1 shows how sensitivity to the out-
come difference between LL and SS diminishes with the addition
of xM to both xS and xL. Diminishing sensitivity falls between two
limits: Constant sensitivity (the valued outcome difference is xL 
xS  $100, regardless of xM) and insensitivity (the valued outcome
difference is $0, regardless of xM). Between these limits, sensitiv-
ity to the outcome difference between LL and SS diminishes with
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the addition of xM, but it can be seen that on the scale from $0 to
$100, it diminishes very little. On the other hand, the effect of
delay adjustment is substantial. The adjusted delay of SS will lie
between tS  0 and tM  4, and the adjusted delay of LL will lie
between tM  4 and tL  50. With the addition of xM at tM, the
delay of SS increases from tS  0 to tˆS  2, whereas the delay of
LL decreases from tL  50 to tˆL  28.5 Therefore, the adjusted
delays are a lot closer than the unadjusted ones. We thus predicted
that the addition of xM at tM would lead to an increased preference
for LL.
Method
A total of 132 workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (U.S.
residents, 39% male, average age of 46 years, 98% having at least
attended college or university, and 59% being employed) partici-
pated by completing an online questionnaire related to several
studies. The present study included two items, one involving single
outcomes and the other involving two-outcome sequences. Each
participant responded to both items, in an order randomized across
participants.
Results
The results for the single outcomes were as follows:
SS: Receive $300 today. [80%]
LL: Receive $400 in 50 weeks. [20%]
The results for the two-outcome sequences were as follows:
SS: Receive $300 today and receive $350 in 4 weeks. [73%]
LL: Receive $350 in 4 weeks and receive $400 in 50 weeks. [27%]
Thus, in violation of independence, the common consequence of
$350 in 4 weeks increased the preference for LL, 2(1)  3.86, p 
.005. According to the tradeoff model, this result shows that delay
adjustment outweighed diminishing sensitivity to accumulated
outcomes.
Experiment 2:
Zero Outcomes and Front-End Amounts
While Experiment 1 pitted the effect of delay adjustment against
the effect of diminishing sensitivity to accumulated outcomes,
Experiment 2 introduced preference for spreading and applied all
three elements of the tradeoff model to the hidden-zero effect and
the front-end amount effect.
Hidden-Zero Effect
The hidden-zero effect is that making zero outcomes explicit
increases preference for LL. We examine two scenarios. One is the
introduction of explicit-zero outcomes to a choice between two
single outcomes, as in Magen et al. (2008). Consider Pair A in
Table 1. The choice between “$10 today” and “$30 in 2 months,”
in which both SS and LL are single outcomes, becomes a choice
between “$10 today and $0 in 2 months” and “$0 today and $30 in
2 months,” in which both SS and LL are sequences. The hidden-
zero effect is, in this scenario, the net result of two processes.
On the one hand, the explicit-zero outcomes introduce a situa-
tion in which LL deviates more from a uniform distribution than
SS (1/20  30  15  1/210  0  5), and this decreases the
preference for LL. On the other hand, the explicit-zero outcome
increases the delay of SS (for q  .3, from 0 to  1/2) and
decreases the delay of LL (from 2 to  1.5), which increases the
preference for LL. The hidden-zero effect occurs when delay
adjustment outweighs preference for spreading.
The other scenario is the introduction of an explicit-zero out-
come to a choice between a single outcome and a sequence.
Consider Pair B in Table 1. The choice between “$510 today” and
“$500 today and $30 in 2 months,” in which SS is a single outcome
and LL is a sequence, becomes a choice between “$510 today and
$0 in 2 months” and “$500 today and $30 in 2 months,” in which
both SS and LL are sequences. The hidden-zero effect is, in this
scenario, the joint result of two processes: The explicit-zero out-
come introduces a situation in which SS deviates from a uniform
distribution (d  255), and increases the delay of SS (for q  .3,
from 0 to  0.5). Both of these processes increase the preference
for LL, thus producing the hidden-zero effect.
Front-End Amount Effect
The front-end amount effect, as reported by Rao and Li (2011),
is that adding a common amount to the immediate outcomes of
5 Because xM is very similar to xS and xL, the weighted averages of tS and
tM, and of tM and tL will be very similar to the unweighted averages. The
adjusted delay of SS is  2, regardless of the averaging rule. The adjusted
delay of LL lies between 27 (unweighted average) and  28.5 (weighted
average). If in Equation 2, q  .3, which is a value close to the estimates
that we obtain later on in a quantitative analysis, the adjusted delay of LL
is  28 weeks.
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Sensitivity to outcome differences as a function
of the accumulated outcomes of SS (smaller but sooner) and LL (larger but
later).
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both options decreases the preference for LL. In Table 1, this
happens when moving from Pair A to Pair B. In the tradeoff
model, the front-end amount effect is the net result of three
processes. Two of these, delay adjustment and diminishing sensi-
tivity, apply equally to the explicit- and implicit-zero conditions.
The third, preference for spreading, operates differently in these
two conditions.
Delay adjustment and diminishing sensitivity. On the one
hand, the front-end amount does not change the delay of SS, but it
decreases the delay of LL, which increases the preference for LL.6
On the other hand, with the introduction of the front-end amount,
the sensitivity to the outcome difference between LL and SS
diminishes, which decreases the preference for LL.7
Preference for spreading. In the implicit-zero condition, the
front-end amount changes a situation in which both options are
single outcomes, and therefore are not adversely affected by the
deviation from a uniform distribution, to a situation in which SS
remains a single outcome but LL becomes a sequence, and thus
becomes affected by the deviation from a uniform distribution
(d  235). This decreases the preference for LL. In the explicit-
zero condition, the front-end amount changes a situation in which
LL deviates more from a uniform distribution than SS (15  5) into
one in which the reverse is true (235  255). This increases the
preference for LL.
Conclusion. In the implicit-zero condition, the front-end
amount effect occurs when diminishing sensitivity and preference
for spreading outweigh delay adjustment; in the explicit-zero con-
dition, it occurs when diminishing sensitivity outweighs preference
for spreading and delay adjustment.
Reversal of the Front-End Amount Effect
The tradeoff model also points to the possibility that the front-
end amount effect may reverse. We next compared Pairs A–B, in
which, drawing on the results reported by Rao and Li (2011), we
expected the front-end amount effect, with Pairs D–E, in which the
front-end amount effect may reverse.
Implicit-zero condition. In this condition, the front-end
amount effect reverses when delay adjustment outweighs dimin-
ishing sensitivity and preference for spreading. When moving from
Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, the effects of all three processes are
attenuated, and any reversal of the front-end amount effect de-
pends on whether delay adjustment outweighs diminishing sensi-
tivity and preference for spreading.
By diminishing sensitivity, the front-end amount decreases pref-
erence for LL. However, sensitivity diminishes at a diminishing
rate: Adding €500 to €30 and €10 (in Pairs A–B) leads to a greater
decrease in the sensitivity to the outcome difference than adding
another €500 to €530 and €510 (in Pairs D–E), as shown in Figure
2. Therefore, when moving from Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, the
negative effect of diminishing sensitivity on the preference for LL
is attenuated.
By preference for spreading, the front-end amount decreases
preference for LL. In each option pair, SS is a single outcome, and
therefore is not adversely affected by the deviation from a uniform
distribution. In Pairs A and D, LL is also a single outcome, and is
therefore not affected either by the deviation from a uniform
distribution. In Pairs B and E, however, LL is a sequence, and one
that deviates more from a uniform distribution in Pair B (d  235)
6 In the implicit-zero condition, SS is a single outcome, so that there is
no delay adjustment. In the explicit-zero condition, SS is a sequence of a
positive outcome and a zero outcome, so that by the proposition of
outcome-independent weighing of delays to stated zero outcomes, the
adjusted delay of SS is unaffected by the magnitude of the positive
outcome.
7 The front-end amounts employed by Rao and Li (2011) ranged from
huge (hundreds of thousands of yuans) to gigantic (hundreds of billions of
yuans). As discussed next, it is not necessary to employ such numbers in
order to obtain the front-end amount effect.
Table 1
Adding a Common Amount (A0;2) to the Immediate Outcome of Smaller But Sooner (SS) and the
Delayed Outcome of Larger but Longer (LL) and Adding a Common Amount (A0) to the
Immediate Outcomes of Both Options in the Explicit-Zero Condition
A0
A0;2
€0 €500 €1,000
€0 A D G
(€10, 0; €0, 2) (€510, 0; €0, 2) (€1,010, 0; €0, 2)
(€0, 0; €30, 2) (€0, 0; €530, 2) (€0, 0; €1,030, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
€500 B E H
(€510, 0; €0, 2) (€1,010, 0; €0, 2) (€1,510, 0; €0, 2)
(€500, 0; €30, 2) (€500, 0; €530, 2) (€500, 0; €1,030, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
€1,000 C F I
(€1,010, 0; €0, 2) (€1,510, 0; €0, 2) (€2,010, 0; €0, 2)
(€1,000, 0; €30, 2) (€1,000, 0; €530, 2) (€1,000, 0; €1,030, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
Note. Implicit-zero condition is obtained by suppressing zero outcomes. Delays are in months. Percentages are
monthly interest rates.
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than in Pair E (d  15). Thus, when moving from Pairs A–B to
Pairs D–E, the negative effect of preference for spreading on the
preference for LL is attenuated.
By delay adjustment, the front-end amount increases preference
for LL. In each option pair, SS is a single outcome, so that its delay
is not adjusted (0). In Pairs A and D, LL is also a single outcome,
so that its delay is not adjusted either (2). In Pairs B and E,
however, LL is a sequence, and one that has a shorter adjusted
delay in Pair B (for q  .3,  0.5) than in Pair E (about 1).
Therefore, when moving from Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, the posi-
tive effect of delay adjustment on the preference for LL is atten-
uated.
In sum, when moving from Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, both the
positive effect of delay adjustment on the preference for LL and the
negative effects of diminishing sensitivity and preference for
spreading on the preference for LL are attenuated. The front-end
amount effect reverses when the attenuated effect of delay adjust-
ment is greater than the attenuated effects of diminishing sensitiv-
ity and preference for spreading.
Explicit-zero condition. In this condition, the front-end
amount effect reverses when preference for spreading and delay
adjustment outweigh diminishing sensitivity. When moving from
Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, the negative effect of diminishing sensi-
tivity on the preference for LL and the positive effect of delay
adjustment on the preference for LL are, as in the implicit-zero
condition, attenuated, but the positive effect of preference for
spreading on the preference for LL is accentuated. On the one
hand, the difference between LL and SS in the deviation from a
uniform distribution is 15 – 5  10 (in favor of SS) in Pair A and
235 – 255 20 (in favor of LL) in Pair B. On the other hand, the
difference between LL and SS in the deviation from a uniform
distribution is 265 – 255  10 (in favor of SS) in Pair D, and 15 
505  490 (in favor of LL) in Pair E. Therefore, when moving
from Pairs A–B to Pairs D–E, the positive effect of preference for
spreading on the preference for LL is accentuated. The front-end
amount effect reverses when the accentuated effect of preference
for spreading and the attenuated effect of delay adjustment are
greater than the attenuated effect of diminishing sensitivity.
Method
A total of 277 Portuguese residents (42% male, average age 30
years, 65% having at least completed college or university, and
74% being employed or a student) participated by completing an
online questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to the
implicit-zero condition or the explicit-zero condition. The order of
the stimuli in Table 1 was randomized across participants.
Results
Figure 3 shows the choice probabilities for the nine cells of the
within-participant design separately for the implicit-zero and the
explicit-zero conditions. We conducted a 3 (common amount
added to the immediate outcome of SS and the delayed outcome of
LL, denoted as A0;2)  3 (common amount added to the immediate
outcomes of both options, denoted as A0)  2 (implicit- or explicit-
zero outcomes) mixed analysis of variance. Three results emerged.
First, preference for LL decreased as A0;2 increased, F(2, 550) 
125.46, p  .005, p2  .31. This is the relative magnitude effect,
and can be accounted by the interest-rate model, because interest
rates decrease as A0;2 increases, and by the tradeoff model, because
the sensitivity to accumulated outcomes decreases as A0;2 in-
creases.
Furthermore, preference for LL increased when zero outcomes
were stated explicitly, F(1, 275)  41.07, p  .005, p2  .13. This
is the hidden-zero effect and is a replication of the result reported
by Magen et al. (2008).
Finally, A0;2 interacted with A0, F(4, 1100)  48.76, p  .005,
p
2  .15. For A0;2  €0 (Cells A, B, and C), preference for LL
decreased as A0 increased, F(2, 550)  17.79, p  .005, p2  .06.
This is the front-end amount effect and is a replication of the result
reported by Rao and Li (2011). For A0;2  €500 (Cells D, E, and
F) and €1,000 (Cells G, H, and I), however, preference for LL
increased as A0 increased, F(2, 550)  61.12, p  .005, p2  .18.
This is a reversal of the front-end amount effect. Overall, the
implications of the tradeoff model were confirmed.8
Experiment 3: Front-End and Back-End Amounts
Experiment 2 investigated the net results of delay adjustment,
diminishing sensitivity to accumulated outcomes, and preference
for spreading; in contrast, Experiment 3 isolated the effect of
preference for spreading by comparing the front-end amount con-
dition, in which a common amount is added to the immediate
outcomes of both options (see Table 1), with a back-end amount
condition, in which the common amount is added to the delayed
8 Other significant results were a main effect of A0;2, F(2, 550)  19.58,
p  .005, p2 .07, which was qualified by its interaction with A0 and a
weak and subtle interaction effect between A0;2 and the implicit-zero versus
explicit-zero condition, F(2, 550)  3.17, p  .005, p2 .01.
Figure 2. Experiments 2 and 3: Sensitivity to outcome differences as a
function of the accumulated outcomes of SS (smaller but sooner) and LL
(larger but later).
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outcomes of both options (see Table 2). Pairs A, D, and G are the
same in the two conditions, because the common amount is €0. We
therefore focus on the other pairs, in which the common amount is
either €500 or €1,000.
A comparison between the two tables controls for the effects of
diminishing sensitivity and delay adjustment and thus isolates the
effect of preference for spreading, as discussed next.
Diminishing Sensitivity
For each choice in Tables 1 and 2, the accumulated outcomes
are the same. For instance, in Pair B, the accumulated outcomes
are €510 for SS and €530 for LL, both in the front-end amount
condition and in the back-end amount condition. Thus, the impact
of diminishing sensitivity is removed.
Delay Adjustment
Relocating the common amount of money from the front end to
the back end increases the adjusted delays of SS and LL by
approximately the same amount of time. The greatest difference
would be observed for Pair B, and when the adjusted delays are
fully weighted averages of the constituent delays: If, in Equation 2,
q  0, relocating the common amount from the front end to the
back end increases the adjusted delay of SS by 1.96 months, and
the adjusted delay of LL by 1.89 months.9 If, however, q  .3, a
value close to the estimates obtained in the next section, the
adjusted delay of SS increases by 1.06 months and the adjusted
delay of LL by 1.02 months. Therefore, the impact of delay
adjustment is also removed.
Preference for Spreading
With the effects of diminishing sensitivity and delay adjustment
controlled for, the comparison between the front-end and back-end
amount conditions isolates the effect of preference for spreading:
In the front-end amount condition, SS deviates more from a uni-
form distribution than LL (for Pair B, 255  235), but, in the
back-end amount condition, the reverse is true (for Pair B, 265 
245). Therefore, choice of LL should be less likely in the back-end
amount condition than in the front-end amount condition.
Method
A total of 470 Portuguese residents (38% male, average age 40
years, 81% having at least completed college or university, and
85% being employed or a student) participated by completing an
online questionnaire.10 Participants were randomly assigned to the
front-end amount condition and the back-end amount condition.
The order of the stimuli in Tables 1 and 2 was randomized across
participants.
Results
Figure 4 shows the choice probabilities for the nine cells of the
within-participant design, separately for the front-end amount and
back-end amount conditions. We conducted a 2 (front-end amount
or back-end amount condition)  3 (common amount added to the
immediate outcomes of both options, denoted as A0, or the delayed
outcomes of both options, denoted as A2)  3 (common amount
added to the immediate outcome of SS and the delayed outcome of
9 The increase in the adjusted delay is   21 qA
1 qA x1  x2
, where
A is the amount being relocated, x1 and x2 are the other amounts in the
sequence, and q is the departure from weighted averaging.
10 The results of this experiment were replicated with 276 U.S. residents
working on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The additive constants used in this
replication were $0, $80, and $480.
Figure 3. Experiment 2: Observed and predicted probability of choosing LL (larger but later) in the nine cells
of the within-participant design (from A to I), separately for the implicit-zero and explicit-zero conditions. The
width of the confidence intervals ranged from .086 to .117.
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LL, denoted as A0;2) mixed analysis of variance. Two results
emerged.
First, preference for LL decreased when A0;2 increased, F(2,
936)  237.16, p  .005, p2  .34. This is the relative magnitude
effect, which can be accounted for by the interest-rate model and
the tradeoff model.
Second, choice of LL was less likely in the back-end amount
condition than in the front-end amount condition, F(1, 468) 
21.61, p  .005, p2  .04. This main effect was qualified by an
interaction effect between condition and the common amount
added in each condition, F(2, 936)  65.71, p  .005, p2  .12:
Choice of LL was less likely in the back-end amount condition
than in the front-end amount condition for A0, A2  €500 (Cells B,
E, and H) and €1,000 (Cells C, F, and I), that is, when the pairs
differed between the conditions, F(1, 468)  48.05, p  .005,
p
2  .09, but not for A0, A2  €0 (Cells A, D, and G), that is, when
the pairs did not differ between the conditions, F(1, 468)  2.17,
p  .10, p2 .00. The difference between the conditions confirms
the effect of preference for spreading. Thus, the implications of the
tradeoff model were again confirmed.11
Quantitative Analysis
So far, we have shown that the tradeoff model can offer a
qualitative account of the data. Because Experiments 2 and 3 each
provide 18 data points, it is feasible to examine whether it can also
offer a quantitative account of the data. We estimated the tradeoff
model on each data set, using the full specification in Equation 3.
Details about the estimation of the tradeoff model are given in the
Appendix. Parameter estimates and goodness of fit are reported in
Table 3. The parameter estimates are similar across experiments
(with q  .3), and the proportion of variance in the choice
probabilities accounted by the tradeoff model is generally in the
nineties. However, the predictions are, on average, off by approx-
imately .05 on a scale from 0 to 1, meaning that there is room for
improvement.
The predictions of the tradeoff model are superimposed on the
observations in Figures 3 and 4. The tradeoff model reproduces the
qualitative predictions that we derived from it in the previous
sections: the relative magnitude effect, the hidden-zero effect, the
front-end amount effect and its reversal, and the effect of relocat-
ing the front-end amount to the back end of both options. How-
ever, there are systematic departures from the observations as well.
The most prominent anomaly is that the tradeoff model underpre-
dicts the probabilities of choosing LL for A0  €1,000 (Cells C, F,
and I) in the implicit-zero condition. A reparameterization could
resolve this, which suggests that the stimulus context had an effect
on parameter values, a problem not uncommon in quantitative
analyses of intertemporal choice (e.g., Scholten & Read, 2012a).
Finally, to successfully apply the model to the data, we had to
upscale “small” differences in the deviation from a uniform dis-
tribution between LL and SS relative to “large” differences (see
Appendix). It would thus seem necessary to introduce an appro-
priate modification to the model in Equation 3. Specifically, the
model would come to include diminishing sensitivity to deviations
from a uniform distribution: The marginal impact of a deviation
decreases with its magnitude. We approximated this with a crude
binary distinction between small and large differences in deviation
between LL and SS, but, in future applications of the model, some
functional form may capture continuously diminishing sensitivity.
11 Other significant results were an interaction effect between {A0, A2}
and A0;2, F(4, 1872)  23.97, p  .005, p2 .05, which was a diluted
version of the front-end amount effect and its reversal, and two other
interaction effects, which were weaker and more subtle: A two-way inter-
action effect between A0;2 and front-end amount versus back-end amount
condition, F(2, 936)  7.36, p  .005, p2 .02, and a three-way interac-
tion effect among {A0, A2}, A0;2, and front-end amount versus back-end
amount condition, F(4, 1872)  3.88, p  .005, p2 .01.
Table 2
Adding a Common Amount (A0;2) to the Immediate Outcome of Smaller but Sooner (SS) and the
Delayed Outcome of Larger but Longer (LL) and Adding a Common Amount (A2) to the
Delayed Outcomes of Both Options
A2
A0;2
€0 €500 €1,000
€0 A D G
(€10, 0; €0, 2) (€510, 0; €0, 2) (€1,010, 0; €0, 2)
(€0, 0; €30, 2) (€0, 0; €530, 2) (€0, 0; €1,030, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
€500 B E H
(€10, 0; €500, 2) (€510, 0; €500, 2) (€1,010, 0; €500, 2)
(€0, 0; €530, 2) (€0, 0; €1,030, 2) (€0, 0; €1,530, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
€1,000 C F I
(€10, 0; €1,000, 2) (€510, 0; €1,000, 2) (€1,010, 0; €1,000, 2)
(€0, 0; €1,030, 2) (€0, 0; €1,530, 2) (€0, 0; €2,030, 2)
73.21% 1.94% 0.99%
Note. Delays are in months. Percentages are monthly interest rates.
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Experiment 4: “Mere” Tokens?
Urminsky and Kivetz (2011) compared the choice between
“$300 in 1 week” and “$900 in 1 year” with several choices
between “A1 in 1 day and $300 in 1 week” and “A1 in 1 day and
$900 in 1 year.” Their participants were very impatient, because a
large majority declined LL in the first choice, where A1 is an
unstated zero outcome. However, when A1 increased from $0 to
$10, there was an abrupt increase in the preference for LL. As A1
further increased to $50, $100, and $200, the preference for LL
increased very little. The authors call this the “mere” token effect,
because preference is affected by the token but seems insensitive
to the magnitude of the token. The mere token effect is a violation
of independence in which the common consequence precedes to
other consequences.
In the tradeoff model, the mere token effect is the net result
of three processes. First, when the token is smaller than the
midpoint between the differentiating outcomes ($300 and
$900), as was the case in Urminsky and Kivetz’s (2011) anal-
ysis, it introduces a situation in which LL deviates more from a
uniform distribution than SS, which decreases preference for
LL. Second, the decision maker is less sensitive to a difference
between A1 	 $900 and A1 	 $300 than to a difference between
$900 and $300, which also decreases the preference for LL.
However, the token leads to a much greater decrease in the
delay of LL (for q  .3, by about 3 months) than in the delay
of SS (no more than about 3 days), and this increases the
preference for LL.12 The mere token effect occurs when delay
adjustment outweighs preference for spreading and diminishing
sensitivity.
The tradeoff model explains why preference was found to be
insensitive to the magnitude of the token. First, LL deviated
more from a uniform distribution than SS, but the difference in
the deviation from a uniform distribution between LL and SS,
that is, 1/2$900  A1  1/2$300  A1, is independent of A1
over the range from $0 to $300, which includes the narrower
range from $0 to $200 considered by Urminsky and Kivetz
(2011). Second, as shown in Figure 5, sensitivity to the differ-
ence between A1 	 $900 and A1 	 $300 diminishes very little
with A1 over the range from $0 to $200. Third, as shown in
Figure 6, the delays of SS and LL decreased sharply when A1
increased from $0 to $10, but much more slightly as A1 further
increased to $50, $100, and $200. Moreover, had the range of
A1 been extended well beyond $200, the adjusted delays would
have decreased much more sharply again. Most of the action
seems to occur between $50 and $5,000, which is the range that
we explored in Experiment 4.
Method
A total of 349 Portuguese residents (43% male, average age 36
years, 77% having at least completed college or university, and
88% being employed or a student) participated by completing an
online questionnaire related to several studies. The present study
included three items. Each participant responded to all three. The
first item was the tokenless choice between “€200 in 1 week” and
“€400 in 1 year.” The remaining items, the order of which was
randomized across participants, introduced tokens of €50 and
€5,000.
12 Diminishing sensitivity to adjusted delays means that the person is
relatively less sensitive to the decrease in the longer adjusted delay of LL
than to the decrease in the shorter adjusted delay of SS.
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Observed and predicted probability of choosing LL (larger but later) in the nine cells
of the within-participant design (from A to I), separately for the front-end amount and back-end amount
conditions. The width of the confidence intervals ranged from .061 to .091.
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Results
In the absence of a token, the choice probabilities were as
follows:
Pair A: SS Receive €200 in 1 week [54%]
LL Receive €400 in 1 year [46%]
Thus, a small majority preferred SS. In the presence of a small
token, the choice probabilities were as follows:
Pair B: SS Receive €50 tomorrow and €200 in 1 week [50%]
LL Receive €50 tomorrow and €400 in 1 year [50%]
It was a tie between SS and LL. The increase in the preference for
LL with the introduction of the small token was marginally sig-
nificant, 2(1)  3.38, p  .10. In the presence of a large token,
the choice probabilities were as follows:
Pair C: SS Receive €5,000 tomorrow and €200 in 1 week [42%]
LL Receive €5,000 tomorrow and €400 in 1 year [58%]
Thus, a small majority preferred LL. The increase in the preference
for LL with the change from a small to a large token was highly
significant, 2(1)  10.05, p  .005. We conclude that preference
does depend on the magnitude of the token, so that the mere token
effect is not a “mere” token effect at all.
In the tradeoff model, the greater preference for LL in Pair B
(the presence of a €50 token) than in Pair A (the absence of a
token) is the net result of two processes that hurt LL and one
process that helps LL. First, with the introduction of the token, the
sensitivity to the outcome difference between LL and SS dimin-
ishes, which decreases the preference for LL, but, as can be seen in
Figure 7, it diminishes very little. Second, the token introduces a
situation in which LL deviates more from a uniform distribution
than SS, which also decreases the preference for LL. However, the
token leads to a much greater decrease in the delay of LL (for q 
.3, by about 106 days) than in the delay of SS (no more than about
2 days), and this increases the preference for LL. The observed
pattern shows that the delay adjustment outweighed diminishing
sensitivity and preference for spreading.
The greater preference for LL in Pair C (the presence of a €5,000
token) than in Pair B (the presence of a €50 token) is the net result
of one process that hurts LL and two processes that help LL. On the
one hand, with the greater magnitude of the token, the sensitivity
to the outcome difference between LL and SS diminishes, which
decreases the preference for LL, and as can be seen in Figure 7, it
diminishes visibly. However, the greater magnitude of the token
changes a situation in which LL deviates more from a uniform
distribution than SS (175  75) into one in which the reverse is
true (2400  2300), which increases the preference for LL. More-
over, the greater magnitude of the token leads to a much greater
decrease in the delay of LL (for q  .3, by about 159 days) than in
Figure 5. Urminsky and Kivetz’s (2011) Experiment 1b: Sensitivity to
outcome differences as a function of the accumulated outcomes of SS
(smaller but sooner) and LL (larger but later).
Table 3
Parameter Estimates and Goodness of Fit of the Tradeoff Model
Variable Description Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Parameter
ε Noise 2.3954 2.6831
 Diminishing sensitivity to accumulated outcomes 0.0026 0.0037

U Preference for spreading of constituent outcomesa 0.0023 0.0023

u Preference for spreading of constituent outcomesa 0.0138 0.0441
 Tradeoff between time and outcome advantages 6.3775 6.1113
 Diminishing sensitivity to (adjusted) delaysb 0.0000 0.0000
q Departure from a weighted averaging of delays 0.2995 0.3468
Statisticc
R2 Goodness of fit .91 .95
Radj2 Adjusted goodness-of-fit .88 .93
RMSD Badness of fit .06 .04
a Small differences in the deviation from a uniform distribution between larger but longer (LL) and smaller but sooner (SS) are upscaled relative to large
differences (i.e., 
u  
U; see Appendix). b Given that the delays were held constant at 0 and 2 and that adjusted delays varied within this narrow range,
 converged to its neutral value of zero (see Appendix). c R2  1  [ (y  yˆ)2/ (y  y)2], where y is the dependent variable (probability of choosing
LL), yˆ is the predicted value of y, y is the mean value of y, and n is the number of data points. Radj2  1  [ (y  yˆ)2/ (y  y)2]  [(n  1)/(n  k)],
where k is the number of free parameters, for which this statistic adjusts. RMSD   y yˆ2/n, the root of the mean squared deviation.
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the delay of SS (no more than about 2.5 days), and this also
increases the preference for LL. The observed pattern shows that
preference for spreading and delay adjustment outweighed dimin-
ishing sensitivity.
In sum, the tradeoff model can accommodate both the “mere”
token effect and its dependence on the magnitude of the token.
Across the four experiments that we conducted, the tradeoff
model, as extended to two-outcome sequences, received substan-
tial support. We next discuss some issues raised by our extension
of the tradeoff model.
General Discussion
We originally developed the tradeoff model for choices between
pairs of single outcomes, a domain in which it accommodates all
anomalies that conventional models of intertemporal choice can
and cannot address. These models include the discounted utility
model (Samuelson, 1937), the (quasi-) hyperbolic discounting
model (Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), and the
discounting by intervals model (Scholten & Read, 2006). In this
article, we extended the tradeoff model to pairwise choices involv-
ing two-outcome sequences. The thrust of our proposal is that
Figure 6. Urminsky and Kivetz’s (2011) Experiment 1b: Adjusted delays of LL (larger but later; top panel) and
SS (smaller but sooner; bottom panel) in choices between “A1 in 1 day and $300 in 1 week” and “A1 in 1 day
and $900 in 1 year.” Token (A1) is logarithmically scaled. Delays are in days. For the unstated zero token, the
delays are 365 (LL) and 7 days (SS). The departure from weighted averaging is q  .3 (solid line), .5 (dashed
line), and .7 (dotted line).
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tradeoffs between sequences are made by weighing accumulated
outcomes against outcome-adjusted delays. Thus extended, the
tradeoff model accommodates all recently discovered anomalies in
pairwise choices involving two-outcome sequences, including the
ones documented in this article.
A prominent model of preferences over sequences is the one
proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1993). In the LP model, the
decision maker chooses the sequence with the highest overall
value. The overall value of a sequence results from the sum of the
(discounted) values of the outcomes in the sequence, preference
for improving sequences of outcome values, and preference for
uniform sequences of outcome values. Three differences between
the LP model and the tradeoff model should be discussed.
First, in the LP model, the outcomes are first valued and then the
(discounted) outcome values are summed (value accumulation),
whereas, in the tradeoff model, the outcomes are first summed and
then the sum is valued (outcome accumulation). In proposing
outcome accumulation, we were motivated by what we consider a
proper representation of dominance relationships. For instance, the
tradeoff model treats the choice between “$500 today” and “$450
today and $50 in 2 months” as a choice between a dominant and
a dominated option, because the accumulated outcomes are the
same ($500) while the delay of the dominant option (0 months) is
shorter than the adjusted delay of the dominated option (between
0 and 2 months). With value accumulation, however, there would
be no dominance relationship: The dominated option would have
an advantage over the dominant option along the outcome attri-
bute, because by diminishing sensitivity to outcomes, v(450) 	
v(50)  v(500). This is prevented by outcome accumulation.
Our step to replace value accumulation by outcome accumula-
tion is remotely similar to the step that Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) took in replacing probability weighing by cumulative prob-
ability weighing. In original prospect theory, dominance detection
had to be postulated as an editing operation prior to the evaluation
of options in order to prevent choice of dominated options. In
cumulative prospect theory, this is automatically prevented by
cumulative probability weighing.
In proposing outcome accumulation, we were also motivated by
the front-end amount effect. In Table 1, preference for LL is
stronger in Choice A than in Choice B. This, with value accumu-
lation, means that
v(30)  v(10)  v(500) 	 v(30)  v(510),
so that
v(10)  v(510)  v(500),
which is inconsistent with diminishing sensitivity to outcomes (see
also Rao & Li, 2011). With outcome accumulation, however, the
stronger preference for LL in Choice A than in Choice B means
that
v(30)  v(10)  v(530)  v(510),
which is consistent with diminishing sensitivity to accumulated
outcomes. Therefore, outcome accumulation, in combination with
Figure 7. Experiment 4: Sensitivity to outcome differences as a function of the accumulated outcomes of SS
(smaller but sooner) and LL (larger but later).
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diminishing sensitivity, yields the front-end amount effect among
the countervailing forces of preference for spreading and delay
adjustment. In addition, outcome accumulation (first summing
outcomes and then valuing the sum) seems cognitively less taxing
than value accumulation (first valuing outcomes and then sum-
ming the valued outcomes): It requires k  1 fewer operations,
where k is the number of outcomes. This may be a motive for
evaluating sequences by outcome accumulation rather than value
accumulation. If, however, the tradeoff model is to be extended to
sequences of qualitative outcomes, outcome accumulation must be
revisited.
The second difference between the LP model and the tradeoff
model is that the former includes preference for spreading outcome
values, whereas the latter includes preference for spreading out-
comes. Preference for spreading outcomes rather than outcome
values preserves equal treatment of what contributes to the value
of a sequence (the sum of the outcomes) and what detracts from
the value of a sequence (the absolute deviation between the out-
comes). In addition, evaluating the spread of outcomes requires k
fewer operations than evaluating the spread of outcome values. If,
however, the tradeoff model is to be extended to sequences of
qualitative outcomes, preference for spreading outcomes must also
be revisited.
The third difference between the LP model and the tradeoff
model is that the former includes preference for improvement,
whereas the latter does not. This decision was more pragmatic than
principled: We found no evidence of preference for improvement
in choices between elementary sequences of monetary outcomes.
Moreover, the available evidence on choices between elementary
sequences of nonmonetary, qualitative outcomes is equivocal.
In Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993) Example 2, an overwhelm-
ing majority preferred visiting an abrasive aunt on one weekend
and then visiting friends on the next weekend over visits in reverse
order. However, in Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993) Example 1,
only a small majority preferred dining at a less liked Greek
restaurant in 1 month and then dining at a better liked French
restaurant in 2 months over dinners in reverse order, which could
be ascribed to a preference for spreading. Moreover, in Frederick
and Loewenstein’s (2008) Study 2b, an even smaller majority
preferred the improving dinner sequence over the declining one,
and preference for deterioration emerged when the choice task was
replaced by a pricing task. In Frederick and Loewenstein’s (2008)
Study 2a, preference for deterioration also emerged from a match-
ing task involving monetary two-outcome sequences:
A. Receive $2,000 now for signing up as a participant in a 1-year
study and receive another $1,000 when the study is complete.
B. Receive $1,000 now for signing up as a participant in a 1-year
study and receive another $_____ when the study is complete.
The mean response was well over $2,000, and almost no one gave
a response below $2,000. The explanation offered by the tradeoff
model is that the adjusted delay of B is longer than that of A, for
which the decision maker must be compensated.
In sum, preference for improvement and, more generally, pref-
erences over sequences depend on the context and method of
preference elicitation and in ways that are not yet well understood.
The extended tradeoff model may receive its strongest support
from choice tasks involving monetary, or, more generally, quan-
titative, outcomes. In future development of the model, it may be
necessary to include preference for improvement.
While we agree that preferences over sequences are conditioned
by multiple motives and that different contexts and methods of
preference elicitation tap into different motives (Frederick & Loe-
wenstein, 2008), we also consider the current extension of the
tradeoff model a promising step in the prediction of preferences
over sequences. It covers all the latest anomalies in pairwise
choices involving elementary sequences of monetary outcomes.
Extension beyond this restricted domain is left as a challenge for
future development.
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Appendix
Quantitative Application of the Tradeoff Model
In this appendix, we provide the details about the estimation of
the tradeoff model. The adjusted delays are given by Equation 2,
and the tradeoff rule is given by Equation 3.
Outcome Valuation
The value of an accumulated outcome is given by a logarithmic
function:
vx1  x2
1

log1 x1  x2,
where   0 is diminishing sensitivity. As  approaches zero, v
approaches an identity function, that is, v(x)  x (constant sensi-
tivity); as  approaches infinity, v approaches a zero function, that
is, v(x)  0 for all x (insensitivity). The value function is a
logarithmic function, so that the subtractive tradeoff rule in Equa-
tions 1 and 3 produces bilinear interaction effects (Scholten &
Read, 2010): The present value of a delayed outcome increases
more steeply with its magnitude over a shorter delay than over a
longer one.
Devaluation for the Deviation From a Uniform
Distribution: Preference for Spreading
An accumulated outcome is devalued for the deviation of the
constituent outcomes from a uniform distribution:
vx1  x2 
 dx1, x2,
where
dx1, x2 1/2 x1  x2  .
Preference for spreading is captured by 
  0. The 
 parameter
also serves the technical purpose of scaling d(x1, x2) relative to
v(x1 	 x2). In the stimulus designs of Experiments 2 and 3, the
differences in the deviation from a uniform distribution between
LL and SS, that is, d(xL1, xL2)  d(xS1, xS2), varied substantially
across option pairs (in absolute magnitude, from 10 to 1,010), and
preliminary analyses showed that it would be necessary to upscale
small differences (10, 15, and 20) relative to large differences
(between 235 and 1,010). That is, 
u  
U for small (u) and large
(U) differences.
Time Weighing
Like the value of an accumulated outcome, the weight of an
adjusted delay is given by a logarithmic function:
wtˆ
1

log1 tˆ,
where   0 is diminishing sensitivity. As  approaches zero, w
approaches an identity function, that is, w tˆ  tˆ (constant sen-
sitivity). As  approaches infinity, w approaches a zero function,
that is, wtˆ  0 for all tˆ (insensitivity). In the stimulus designs of
Experiments 2 and 3, the constituent delays, t1 and t2, were held
constant at 0 and 2. With tˆ varying within this narrow range, 
converged to its neutral value of zero in both experiments.
Choice Rule
The tradeoff model was estimated through a logistic regression,
conducted by the solver routine in Microsoft Excel (see also Lopes
& Oden, 1999). Specifically, the model was
log
1
ε
vxL1  xL2 vxS1  xS2 
dxL1, xL2 dxS1, xS2
 wtˆL wtˆS,
where  are the odds of choosing LL, and ε  0 is a “noise”
parameter (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2010). As ε
approaches zero, there is no noise, and choice is entirely deter-
mined by the model, so that the predicted values of log() go to
plus infinity (probability of choosing LL is 1) or minus infinity
(probability of choosing LL is 0). As ε approaches infinity, there is
only noise, and choice is not at all determined by the model, so that
the predicted values of log() equal 0 (probability of choosing LL
is 1/2). The special case of indifference (Equation 3) arises when
the outcome advantage is equal to the time advantage, so that
log()  0, regardless of the value of ε.
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